

OLE KOKSVIK

Philosophy Department
The Australian National University
Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia

+61 422 942 886
www.koksvik.net
ole.koksvik@anu.edu.au

Norwegian citizen, holder of Australian permanent residence

Areas of Specialisation: Philosophy of Mind, Global Justice

Areas of Competence: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Logic

Education

PhD, Philosophy Approved Jan 2012
The Australian National University with no revisions
Thesis title: *Intuition*
Supervisors: Professors Chalmers (chair), Jackson, Schellenberg, and Stoljar

Master of Arts Jul 2004 – Sep 2006
Monash University
Thesis title: *In Defence of Interactionism*

Logic Course Jan – Jun 2004
University of Bergen

Honours in Philosophy Feb – Dec 2003
Monash University

Bachelor of Arts 1998 – 2002
University of Bergen
Philosophy, Psychology, Spanish

Additional Education

Philosophy Department, New York University Sep – Nov 2010
Visiting Graduate Student

Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo Nov 2008 – Jan 2009
Visiting Graduate Student

Arché, University of St Andrews Sep – Nov 2008
Visiting Graduate Student

Papers

Published

2010. 'Metaphysics of Consciousness'. In G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia*, Monash ePress.

2007. 'Conservation of Energy is Relevant to Physicalism'. *Dialectica* 61: 573–82.

⇒ Abstracts for all papers are available on www.koksvik.net

⇒ This document contains hyperlinks; place cursor over text to reveal

Under Review

‘Intuition, Belief, and Rational Criticisability’.

‘Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique’.

‘Intuition Can Result from Conscious Reasoning’

In Progress

‘The Phenomenal Character of Intuition and Perception’

‘Liberalism about Intuition’

‘The Composition Question for Phenomenal Experience’

‘Conscious Belief’ (with Dr Tang)

‘Global Poverty and the Petroleum Fund’ (with Dr Øverland)

‘Is Profiting from Poverty Illicit?’ (with Dr Øverland)

‘Against Practice Dependence’ (with Dr Southwood)

Grant Success

Principal author of, and named researcher on, Responding to Local Poverty, a research project funded by the Norwegian Research Council, 2011.

Academic Work

Research Associate , Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics Research on the role of intuition in the global justice debate	2011 – 2012
Researcher , Responding to Local Poverty Research on the obligations of affluent states to alleviate poverty	2011
Research Assistant to Professor Chalmers Proofreading of and comments on <i>The Character of Consciousness</i>	2010 – 2011
Research Assistant to Doctors Barry and Øverland Detailed comments on drafts of research papers	2010 – 2011
Lecturer and Convener , PHIL2099 — Ideas, Causality and Personal Identity: Issues from Locke and Hume	2010
Researcher , Faculty of Arts Postgraduate Publication Award, Monash University Producing publications based on Masters thesis	2006 – 2007
Research Assistant to Dr Handfield, Monash University Research on ‘peer instruction’ in philosophy	2006
Tutor , PHL2210 — Thinking About Science, Monash University	Sem1, 2006
Lecturer , Honours and Postgraduate course on Natural Kinds, Monash University	Sem1, 2006
Tutor , PHL2670 — Philosophy of Religion, Monash University	Sem2, 2005
Tutor , PHL2170 — Symbolic Logic, Monash University	Sem1, 2005

Selected Presentations

‘Profiting from Poverty: A Case of Illicit Profit?’ ANU Philosophy Postgraduate Conference, Kioloa	Dec 2011
‘Do Norwegians Have a Responsibility to Fight Poverty in India?’ Poverty and Indo-Norwegian Relations, Workshop, Delhi	Apr 2011
‘What Do Minimal Pair Arguments Show?’ Annual Conference, the Australasian Association of Philosophy, Sydney	Jul 2010
‘The Nature of Intuition’ The ANU Philosophy Society, Canberra	Mar 2009
‘The Phenomenology of Intuition: Some promise for the perceptual model’ Consciousness at the Beach III, Kioloa	Feb 2009
‘Intuition, Belief and Disposition to Believe’ Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Oslo	Dec 2008
‘Intuition, Belief and Disposition to Believe’ Arché Methodology Seminar, St Andrews	Oct 2008
‘The Perceptual Model of Intuition’ Annual Conference, The Australasian Association of Philosophy, Melbourne	Jul 2008

Honors and Awards

Vice-Chancellor’s Travel Grant for Cross-Institutional Visit The Australian National University (Visit to New York University)	Sep – Nov 2010
International Student Fellowship Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature	Nov 2008 – Jan 2009
Vice-Chancellor’s Travel Grant for Cross-Institutional Visit The Australian National University (Visit to Arché, St Andrews and the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Oslo)	Sep – Nov 2008
Australian Postgraduate Award The Australian National University	2007 – 2010
Vice-Chancellor’s Commendation for Masters Thesis Excellence (1 of 4 awarded) Monash University	Mar 2007
Award for best Masters thesis in the Faculty of Arts Monash University	Mar 2007
Faculty of Arts Postgraduate Publication Award Monash University	Nov 2006 – Feb 2007
Monash Graduate Scholarship Monash University	Jan 2005 – Sep 2006
Monash International Postgraduate Research Scholarship Monash University	Jan 2005 – Sep 2006
Monash Arts International Postgraduate Research Scholarship Monash University	Jul – Dec 2004

Languages

Norwegian: mother tongue

English: fluent

Spanish: oral – fluent, written – intermediate

German: intermediate

Abstract of Doctoral Dissertation

In my dissertation, entitled *Intuition*, I seek to advance our understanding of what intuitions are. I argue that intuitions are experiences of a certain kind. They are, in particular, experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character.

I start by identifying the target and providing some important preliminaries. Intuitions are mental states, but which ones? Giving examples helps: a person has an intuition when it seems to her that torturing the innocent is wrong, or that if something is red it is coloured. We can also provide an initial characterisation of the state by saying that it has representational content, often causes belief, and appears to justify belief. In addition, there is something it is like to have an intuition: intuition has a certain phenomenal character.

Some argue that intuition does not explain anything which cannot be explained by other mental states. One version of this view takes intuition to reduce to belief. In Chapter 2 I argue that this entails that agents are rationally criticisable in situations where we know they are not, and that such views are therefore untenable. A parallel argument shows that the corresponding approach to perception fails. This suggests a similarity in nature: both intuition and perception are experiences.

Others take intuition to reduce to a disposition to have a belief. In Chapter 3 I consider a line of argument against such views, find it unsuccessful, and present two new arguments. One is likely to be dialectically ineffective. The other suffers no such weakness: it shows that the proposed reduction fails. As before, the argument also applies to perception, and suggests that intuition and perception are both experiences.

In the remainder of the thesis I develop an account of intuition as an experience. I distinguish between content-specific and attitude-specific phenomenology, and argue that intuition lacks the former (Chapter 4), but has the latter (Chapter 5). This allows us to say what intuition is: it is an experience with representational content and with attitude-specific phenomenology of a certain kind.

In Chapter 6 I put this account of intuition to use. When a person has a perceptual or intuitional experience, I argue that simply having the experience is what makes the subject justified in believing what the experience represents. Moreover, what explains that intuition and perception can justify belief in this way is precisely their phenomenal character.

The dissertation was approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in January 2012, with no revisions. It is available for download on www.koksvik.net.