

DR OLE KOKSVIK

Postdoctoral Research Fellow

Department of Philosophy
University of Bergen
Bergen, Norway

+47 4508 4606
www.koksvik.net
ole.koksvik@gmail.com

Citizen of Norway, permanent resident in Australia

Areas of Specialisation: Philosophy of Mind, Epistemology, Global Justice

Areas of Competence: Logic, Metaphysics

Papers

Published and Forthcoming

Forthcoming. 'Phenomenal Contrast: A Critique'. *American Philosophical Quarterly*.

2014. 'Three Models of Phenomenal Unity'. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 21: 105–131.

2014. 'Aspects of Phenomenal Unity'. *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 21: 6–12.

2013. 'Intuition and Conscious Reasoning'. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 63: 709 – 715.

2010. 'Metaphysics of Consciousness'. In G. Oppy and N. Trakakis (eds.), *A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia*, Monash ePress.

2007. 'Conservation of Energy is Relevant to Physicalism'. *Dialectica* 61: 573–82.

In Progress

Single Author

'Phenomenology of Objectivity Explains Transparency'

'Against the Leibnizian View of Phenomenal Unity'

'Intuition, Belief, and Rational Criticisability'

'Liberalism about Intuitional Experience'

Co-authored

'Illicit Profit' (with [Dr Øverland](#))

'Global Poverty and the Petroleum Fund' (with [Dr Øverland](#))

'Killer Beliefs, Dispositions, and Justification?' (with [Dr Simon](#))

'Conscious Belief' (with [Dr Tang](#))

'Against Practice Dependence' (with [Dr Southwood](#))

Abstracts for all papers are available on koksvik.net. This document contains links; place cursor over text to reveal.

Grant Success

2014. Awarded approx. 65,000 kr from the [Meltzer Fund](#) for research travel.

2014. Principal author of a research collaboration project, which was awarded approx. 65,000 kr of internal university funds under the ‘Smådriftsmidler’ scheme.

2011. Principal author of, and named researcher on, [Responding to Local Poverty](#), a research project funded by the Norwegian Research Council.

Education

PhD, Philosophy The Australian National University (ANU) Thesis title: <i>Intuition</i> Supervisors: Professors Chalmers (chair), Jackson, Schellenberg, and Stoljar Approved with no revisions.	2012
Master of Arts Monash University Thesis title: <i>In Defence of Interactionism</i>	Jul 2004 – Sep 2006
Logic Course University of Bergen	Jan – Jun 2004
Honours in Philosophy Monash University	Feb – Dec 2003
Bachelor of Arts University of Bergen Philosophy, Psychology, Spanish	1998 – 2002

Teaching Experience

Seminar Leader, EXPHIL PSSEM — Examen Philosophicum, Seminar for Psychology University of Bergen	Semester 2, 2014
Lecturer, PAAE8011 — Advanced Ethics: Directed Reading ANU	Semester 1, 2012
Lecturer and Convener, PHIL2099 — Ideas, Causality and Personal Identity: Issues from Locke and Hume ANU	Semester 1, 2010
Tutor, PHL2210 — Thinking About Science Monash University	Semester 1, 2006
Lecturer, Honours and Postgraduate course on Natural Kinds Monash University	Semester 1, 2006
Tutor, PHL2670 — Philosophy of Religion Monash University	Semester 2, 2005
Tutor, PHL2170 — Symbolic Logic Monash University	Semester 1, 2005

Other Academic Work

Postdoctoral Research Fellow , Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen	Apr 2013 –
Postdoctoral Research Fellow , School of Philosophy, ANU	Jul – Dec 2012
Postdoctoral Research Fellow , Centre for Moral, Social and Political Theory, ANU	Jan – Jun 2012
Research Associate , Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics Research on the role of intuition in the global justice debate	Dec 2011 – Jun 2012
Research Assistant to Professor Chalmers Proofreading of and comments on <i>Constructing the World</i>	2012
Researcher , Responding to Local Poverty Research supported by the Norwegian Research Council	2011
Research Assistant to Professor Chalmers Proofreading of and comments on <i>The Character of Consciousness</i>	2010 – 2011
Research Assistant to Doctors Barry and Øverland Detailed comments on drafts of research papers	2010 – 2011
Researcher , Faculty of Arts Postgraduate Publication Award, Monash University Producing publications based on Masters thesis	2006 – 2007
Research Assistant to Dr Handfield, Monash University Research on ‘peer instruction’ in philosophy	2006

International Visits

Adjunct Research Fellow , Philosophy Department, Monash University	Feb – May 2014
Visiting Student , Department of Philosophy, New York University	Sep – Nov 2010
Visiting Student , Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature	Nov 2008 – Jan 2009
Visiting Student , Arché, University of St Andrews	Sep – Nov 2008

Honors and Awards

Meltzer Fund Award for Research Travel (Visit to Monash University and ANU)	Feb – May 2014
Vice-Chancellor’s Travel Grant for Cross-Institutional Visit The Australian National University (Visit to New York University)	Sep – Nov 2010
International Student Fellowship Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature	Nov 2008 – Jan 2009
Vice-Chancellor’s Travel Grant for Cross-Institutional Visit The Australian National University (Visit to Arché, St Andrews and the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, Oslo)	Sep – Nov 2008
Australian Postgraduate Award The Australian National University	2007 – 2010
Vice-Chancellor’s Commendation for Masters Thesis Excellence (1 of 4 awarded) Monash University	Mar 2007

Award for best Masters thesis in the Faculty of Arts Monash University	Mar 2007
Faculty of Arts Postgraduate Publication Award Monash University	Nov 2006 – Feb 2007
Monash Graduate Scholarship Monash University	Jan 2005 – Sep 2006
Monash International Postgraduate Research Scholarship Monash University	Jan 2005 – Sep 2006
Monash Arts International Postgraduate Research Scholarship Monash University	Jul – Dec 2004

Selected Presentations

‘Killer Beliefs, Dispositions, and Justification’ (with Dr Simon) Workshop on First-Personal Data , University of Bergen	Aug 2014
‘Three Models of Phenomenal Unity’ ANU	Mar 2014
‘Answering the Absent-Experience Challenge to Intuition’ Monash University, Melbourne	Mar 2014
‘Pushiness’ Workshop on ‘Imperative Aspects of Perception’ , CSMN, University of Oslo	Aug 2013
‘Three Models of Phenomenal Unity’ Workshop on ‘the Unity of Consciousness’ , Bergen	Aug 2013
‘Answering the Absent-Experience Challenge to Intuition’ Department Seminar, University of Bergen	May 2013
‘Profiting from Poverty: A Case of Illicit Profit?’ ANU Philosophy Postgraduate Conference, Kioloa	Dec 2011
‘Do Norwegians Have a Responsibility to Fight Poverty in India?’ Poverty and Indo-Norwegian Relations , Workshop, Delhi	Apr 2011
‘What Do Minimal Pair Arguments Show?’ Annual Conference, the Australasian Association of Philosophy, Sydney	Jul 2010
‘The Nature of Intuition’ The ANU Philosophy Society, Canberra	Mar 2009
‘The Phenomenology of Intuition: Some promise for the perceptual model’ Consciousness at the Beach III, Kioloa	Feb 2009
‘Intuition, Belief and Disposition to Believe’ Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature , Oslo	Dec 2008
‘Intuition, Belief and Disposition to Believe’ Arché Methodology Seminar , St Andrews	Oct 2008
‘The Perceptual Model of Intuition’ Annual Conference, The Australasian Association of Philosophy, Melbourne	Jul 2008

Referees

Professor David Chalmers
Department of Philosophy
New York University
New York, NY 10003
USA
chalmers@anu.edu.au

Professor Uriah Kriegel
Institut Jean Nicod
Ecole Normale Supérieure
F-75005 Paris
France
theuriah@gmail.com

Dr Nicholas Southwood
Department of Philosophy
The Australian National University
Acton ACT 0200
Australia
nicholas.southwood@anu.edu.au

Abstract of Doctoral Dissertation

In my dissertation, entitled *Intuition*, I argue that intuitions are experiences with representational content, and with a certain phenomenal character.

I start by identifying the target and providing some important preliminaries. Intuitions are mental states, but which ones? Giving examples helps: a person has an intuition when it seems to her that torturing the innocent is wrong, or that if something is red it is coloured. We can also provide an initial characterisation of the state by saying that it has representational content, often causes belief, and appears to justify belief. In addition, there is something it is like to have an intuition: intuition has a certain phenomenal character.

Some argue that intuition does not explain anything which cannot be explained by other mental states. One version of this view takes intuition to reduce to belief. In Chapter 2 I argue that this entails that agents are rationally criticisable in situations where we know they are not, and that such views are therefore untenable. A parallel argument shows that the corresponding approach to perception fails. This suggests a similarity in nature: both intuition and perception are experiences.

Others take intuition to reduce to a disposition to have a belief. In Chapter 3 I consider a line of argument against such views, find it unsuccessful, and present two new arguments. One is likely to be dialectically ineffective. The other suffers no such weakness: it shows that the proposed reduction fails. As before, the argument also applies to perception, and suggests that intuition and perception are both experiences.

In the remainder of the thesis I develop an account of intuition as an experience. I distinguish between content-specific and attitude-specific phenomenology, and argue that intuition lacks the former (Chapter 4), but has the latter (Chapter 5). This allows us to say what intuition is: it is an experience with representational content and with attitude-specific phenomenology of a certain kind.

In Chapter 6 I put this account of intuition to use. When a person has a perceptual or intuitional experience, I argue that simply having the experience is what makes the subject justified in believing what the experience represents. Moreover, what explains that intuition and perception can justify belief in this way is precisely their phenomenal character.

The dissertation was approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in January 2012, with no revisions. It is available for download on www.koksvik.net, where a longer summary can also be found.